John Axcelson, Rob Genter
Colloquium F2005x – Enlightenment and Revolution
November 9, 2000
The Unenlightened Federalists
Although the U.S. Constitution is still considered a model form of government after 200 years, the Federalist Papers which were instrumental in its original ratification in some respects represent an ideological backlash that is anti-enlightenment. While the original Declaration of Independence and Articles of Confederation invoke the enlightened political rhetoric of the 18th century, the new Constitution and the Federalist Papers advocated more centralized power, partly to protect the country from the tyranny of the majority. Like the Federalists, opponents of the new Constitution expressed their concerns and warnings in anonymous newspaper letters collectively referred to as the Anti-Federalist Papers. Arguably, the sentiments these papers express are closer to the theories of John Locke and Thomas Paine and thus display a more enlightened philosophythan the letters of Jay, Hamilton, and Madison.
In his Second Treatise of Government, Locke proposes his contract theory that governments should derive their power only from the voluntary consent of individuals, who are naturally free. For this reason, a government must only act withthe “the consent of the majority, giving it either by themselves or their representatives chosen by them” (Locke §140). This emphasis on the will of the majority is especially important to Locke’s political ideology and to subsequent enlightenment thought. It is also particularly relevant for taxation, since government “cannot take from any man any part of his property without his own consent” (§138). Yet the power of the national government to collect taxes is one of the most fundamental differences between the Constitution and the Articles of Confederation. While the Articles only allowed taxes to be “laid and levied by the authority and direction of the legislatures of the several states” (Articles §8), the Constitution clearly states that “Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises” (Constitution §1.8).
In his popular essay Common Sense, Paine said “government even inits best state is but a necessary evil… [However,] the more simple any thing is, the less liable it is to be disordered and the easier repaired when disordered” (Paine 65,68). Although the original task of the Constitutional Convention was to repair the Articles, they instead replaced it with a completely new charter that is substantially longer and more complex. Even the act of ratifying the Constitution, which was voted upon by nine state assemblies and not directly by the populace, was anti-Lockean in that it violated the principle that “the legislative cannot transfer the power of making laws to any other hands… The people alone can appoint the form of common-wealth” (Locke §141).
Under the old Articles of Confederation, the political status of the states was not unlike the status today of individual nations in the UN or of European countries in the EU. The states retained nearly all legislative and executive powers, and the federal government existed primarily to regulate trade between them and to unify them against a potential foreign invasion. The Articles declare that “the said states enter into a firm league of friendship with each other, for their common defence” (Articles §3) but that “each state retains its sovereignty, freedom, and independence” (§2). The existing government’s main weakness was also its primary advantage: it didn’t have any real power over the individual states. Although this led to debilitating disputes over interstate and international commerce, it did protect the states’ unique identities. The 13 states were fairly heterogeneous: although they shared a common language, the giant slave-holding plantations of the wealthy South were significantly different from the small family farms and industrializing cities of the religious North. Consequently, many Anti-Federalists correctly predicted that a strong national government would inevitably lead to civil war (AFP).
While Americans in the 1780s didn’t have the analogy of the EU or UN, the Anti-Federalists did identify themselves with the Romans in the final days of the Republic. In addition to mocking the Federalists’ habit of signing their letters Publius, they suggested this comparison by signing the names of famous anti-imperialist Romans such as Brutus, Cato, and Agrippa. They considered the ratification of the U.S. Constitution, with its powerful new executive branch and central government, equivalent to the downfall of the Roman Republic when Augustus declared himself dictator for life. At stake was the tremendous amount of power that the new national government was going to have, as well as the coinciding loss of local power. Reduced local power would also limit the sway of individual voters and could thus threaten personal liberties. For many Americans, this proposed new government was reminiscent of the elitist centralized power of England’s monarchy.
To convince New York to ratify the Constitution, the Federalist Papers declared that the current government under the Articles of Confederation was defective, but that its weaknesses could be remedied without endangering people’s liberties. Opponents of the Constitution argued that the proposed solution went far beyond solving the existing problems and instead seized the opportunity to create an entirely new, more republican government.
A key goal of this republicanism was to limit or check the direct power of the majority. For example, the Constitution transfers all executive power to a President, who is chosen not by the people but by state-appointed electors (Constitution §2.3). The purpose of the Electoral College is to ensure that such an important decision be made by informed representatives rather than by the whims of the populace. Another federalist construction, defended in essay #39, is the powerful Senate whose members are appointed by state legislatures. While this appears to benefit less populous states, it serves primarily to limit people’s power in directly influencing how they are governed. Even modern historians concede that “the authors [of the Federalist Papers] assumed that the primary political motive of man was self-interest and that men, whether acting individually or collectively, were selfish and only imperfectly rational.” In this respect, their view of man’s innate drives was closer to that of Hobbes than Locke. Thus, “the possibility of good government lay in man's capacity to devise political institutions that would compensate for deficiencies in both reason and virtue in the ordinary conduct of politics” (Britannica). The Constitution’s solution is to establish indirect parliamentary-style elections and an elaborate system of internal checks and balances.
While this may seem like a significant departure from the democratic atmosphere under the Articles of Confederation, some historians have suggested that there were two components to American political ideology all along: 1) a Lockean emphasis on individual liberty and democracy, and 2) a more Platonic desire for wise, just rulers to make the important governing decisions. For example, John Adams states in his 1776 essay Thoughts on Government: “The first necessary step [of governing a large society] is to depute power from the many to a few of the most wise and good” (Adams §53). This fear of an irrational majority and desire for a few elite rulers is one of the particularly unenlightened sentiments that led to the drafting of the Constitution and the Federalist Papers. Hamilton and Madison, who were members of the Constitutional Convention and wrote all but five of the Federalist Papers, used their essays to capitalize on the fear following Shays’sRebellion in 1787, when 1200 farmers rioted in Boston and the national government was powerless to aid Massachusetts’ insufficient state militia.
The heart of the Federalists’ republican argument can be found in Madison’s influential tenth essay, in which he declares that the most important function of a national government is “to break and control the violence of faction” (Federalist p77). For Madison, a faction is any group, regardless of size, with a common interest that is “adverse to the rights of other citizens or to the permanent and aggregate interests of community” (78). Since a faction can be the majority of citizens, however, it is not clear who decides what the ‘aggregate interests of the community’ are. Moreover, he specifically declares that factions most commonly arise from the “unequal distribution of property”, since the large number of those without property will naturally have distinct interests from their creditors (79). “Our governments are too unstable,” Madison wrote, “… and measures are too often decided, not according to the rules of justice and the rights of the minor party, but by the superior force of an interested and overbearing majority” (77). From this perspective, this essay can be seen as an attempt by the aristocracy to provide a legal means of suppressing the rising middle classes that Locke had championed, while at the same time limiting their individual voice in government.
Madison goes on to declare that a republican government is better suited than a democratic one to govern a large population, because “factious combinations [are] less to be dreaded” in a bigger society since it is difficult for any one interest group to build significant electoral clout (Federalist p83). While prevailing thought held that republican government would only be successful over a small homogeneous area, Madison suggested that there would be more stability and justice with a large, heterogeneous population because there was a much lower chance of improper, or factious, majorities arising. The distinction between a proper and an improper majority is fundamental to the Federalists and explains their preference for national power over local power (Britannica).
Defenders of the Federalist Papers point out that there is a legitimate need to control the whims of the majority, particularly when the rights of certain minorities are being systematically abused. They argue that Madison’s 10th essay gets misinterpreted as an attack on majority rule and that “the essay is in reality a defense of social, economic, and cultural pluralism and a defense of a composite majority formed by compromise and conciliation. Decision by such a majority, rather than by a monistic one, would be more likely to accord with the proper ends of government” (Britannica). They would also argue that the Constitution is not anti-Lockean, since its separation of powers and system of checks and balances closely mirrors the model government outlined in Locke’s Second Treatise. Nevertheless, the government the Constitution replaced, while perhaps imperfect, was fundamentally more decentralized and democratic and thereforemore like Locke’s ideal state of nature.
Historically, the Anti-Federalists won the editorial debate, because when New York’s convention met to ratify the Constitution, those opposed outnumbered those in favor 40-19. By that point, however, nine states had already ratified the Constitution, so New York’s only choice was whether to join the new Union or form its own country. The Anti-Federalists instead focused their energy on how to improve the Constitution and limit the powers of the federal government (AFP). One result was the passage of the Bill of Rights two years later.
Democracy is based on the idea that the majority is by definition right, which is a universal, egalitarian ideal of the enlightenment. Republicanism, however, suggests that the majority won’t always do what’s best for society and therefore needs guidance. While this may be true, it presupposes that someone other than the majority can and should decide what’s best for society. It also goes against the emphasis on individual liberty and experience that had become hallmarks of 18th-century thought. Furthermore, this thinking is dangerous because it takes political power out of the hands of thepeople.
In the end, though, the Federalists won out. Today the U.S. government is more powerful than ever: from Social Security to the federal reserve to minimum-wage laws, from mandatory education to the FDA to Roe vs. Wade, the federal government is the dominant legislative force in Americans’ day-to-day lives, although they still have very little direct influence over it. Over time, a central government will inevitably work to increase its power, often beginning with good intentions. But those intentions may eventually diverge from the will of the people, and as Robert Yates (a.k.a. Brutus) warned two hundred years ago, a limited government is “not so necessary to regulate the conduct of good rulers as to restrain that of bad ones” (AFP). Evidence of this danger is suggested by recent surveys, which indicate that 72 percent of Americans “view the federal government as a special interest group that looks out primarily for its own interests.” Today, only half of Americans “say they would support the Constitution if a referendum were held” (POA).
Works Cited
Adams, John. Thoughts on Government (1776). [Reader]
AFP. Anti-Federalist Papers. http://www.constitution.org/afp/afp.htm
Articles of Confederation (1777). [Reader]
Encyclopedia Britannica. Article - The Federalist. http://www.britannica.com
Federalist Papers (1788). [Reader]
Locke, John. Second Treatise of Government (1690). ed. C.B. Macpherson. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1980.
Paine, Thomas. Common Sense (1776). [Reader]
POA. Portrait of America Survey. http://www.constitution.org/col/half4constitution.htm
U.S. Constitution (1787). [Reader]